While the war in Iran has undoubtedly altered the country’s regional and geopolitical stance, what it did to its youth is still being counted – both statistically and ideologically. The harm done began long before the protests that sparked the war, but the number of casualties as a result of conflict has become a stark and dangerous statistic to watch.
Iranian Youth in the Wake of Conflict and the Regime
Iran’s youth have always absorbed a large portion of the impact of the political unrest in Iran, whether that be through violent repression of protests, widespread censorship, and/or limited access to work and schooling. With the war with the United States, though, Iranian youth are not only victims of violence but are also conscripted to fight on Iran’s front, facing executions in the fallout of past protests, and more.
Human rights monitors verified at least 118 children and adolescents killed during the January 2026 crackdown alone. Of more than 42,000 people arrested nationwide during that period, 326 were minors, adolescents, or students. The Iranian state does not report separately, which is telling about how the arrests are being classified administratively. Broader death toll estimates for the crackdown period fall within a very large range depending on the source, from roughly 6,100 confirmed deaths up to tolls exceeding 30,000.
That range reflects a crisis and breakdown in independent verification inside Iran, with foreign militia forces reportedly deployed alongside domestic security services specifically because, per reporting from Iran International, authorities were uncertain domestic police would fire on unarmed protesters. When a state has to import enforcement because its own forces might not follow orders against its own young people, the casualty count becomes as much a measure of regime cohesion as of protest suppression.
“Iranian-backed Iraqi militias began recruiting fighters four days ago to help the Islamic Republic’s forces suppress protests in Iran.” — Iran International
Executions as Continuation of the Crackdown
The clearest through-line from protest to war to now is the judiciary. On July 19, Iranian authorities executed an 18-year-old and a 24-year-old Afghan national in Isfahan, both arrested during the January uprising, on charges of "waging war against God" tied to the deaths of security personnel during protests. Twelve death sentences connected to the same case were upheld by Iran's Supreme Court on July 5.
These incidents represent a judicial process that treats protest-era arrests as standing cases to be prosecuted. Iran has continued to work through them on a rolling basis well after the initial unrest and after the war has receded from international attention. For a generation that has watched protests be met with mass arrest rather than concession and acceptance of political dissent, the current judicial pattern confirms that the Iranian state's playbook for youth dissent has not changed.
Involvement on the Frontlines of War

Another contributing factor to the casualties is the use of child soldiers. For a different sect of youth, children as young as twelve-years-old have become a solution to the recruitment crisis the war posed. The recruitment age was previously set at 16, but the need for manpower has caused the age to drop, posing threats to children forced to serve. As the US has made strikes specifically aimed at Iranian military bases, hospitals, and checkpoints, children are more at risk than ever before, as their positioning at the frontlines of armed conflict has put them at risk.
A reliance on vulnerable minors has put Iran under the watch of humanitarian agencies and international actors, with recruits also citing coercion and unmet promises of compensation and legal protection. Similarly, by formally arming children who have been either informally trained or not trained at all, Iran is contributing to the potential for more war crimes – potentially aimed at their own civilians.
What This Means Beyond the Casualty Figures
The war's aftermath has not resolved the tensions that produced the protests: economic strain, political closure, a leadership transition following Supreme Leader Khamenei's death. Thus, a crackdown this large that has been sustained this long tends to produce one of two outcomes in a young population: continued deterrence of youth dissent, or a deferred suppression of youth that resurfaces once the immediate danger of protest and international backlash passes.

The response from Iran has pointed towards the latter option. Executions carried out months after the arrests suggest the state is still actively worried about the population it continues to suppress. The usage of child soldiers suggests that the backlash from humanitarian actors is less of a consequence than having less personnel. Lastly, the documented involvement of doctors, arrested for treating protesters, alongside students and minors in the detained population, suggests a crackdown that reached well past the visible protest leadership into the broader social infrastructure young Iranians rely on.
For organizations tracking youth political engagement globally, Iran is a difficult but necessary case precisely because the state has made ordinary verification impossible. Casualty tolls, arrests made, and even the ages of the executed are widely contested. The war compounded those difficulties rather than resolving them, as international attention shifted toward the conflict's regional and nuclear dimensions, while the domestic accounting of youth impact has been largely obscured.
The question worth tracking going forward in this war isn't whether Iran's youth will re-emerge politically, as they have historically shown that they will. Instead, the question is whether any youth group will have reliable numbers when they do.
The Centre for Youth Policy is an independent, nonpartisan organization and does not take institutional positions. The views and opinions expressed in this news are solely those of the author.
About the Author
Olivia Anikst
Global Strategy Analyst and Writer
Olivia Anikst is an undergraduate at the University of Chicago studying Global Studies and Political Science. She works as an Analyst and Writer for CYP, researching and reporting on upcoming elections and how young people are affected by the current political climate. Originally from New York City, Olivia spent a semester of 11th grade in Johannesburg, and she hopes to work in International Crisis Management with a regional focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.





